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ARGUMENT 
I. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DID NOT ERR IN RULING BARBARA 
KRAMBULE'S CONTRACTUAL CLAIM 
FOR CHILD SUPPORT IS BARRED 
BY RES JUDICATA 
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly concluded that because 
all facts relating to Barbara Krambule's contractual claim for her 
son Mathew's support were in existence and known to the parties 
prior to the entry of the divorce decree, there has been no 
substantial changed circumstances warranting modification. Hence, 
Barbara Krambule is barred by principles of res judicata from now 
asserting her contractual claim under the artificial insemination 
agreement for Mathew's support which could have and should have 
been litigated in the original divorce proceeding. 
a) Rick Krambule is not the Biological Father of Mathew. 
The trial court made a specific Finding of Fact that Rick 
Krambule is not the biological father of Mathew Krambule. 
(Findings of Fact No. 3 on Motion for Summary Judgment). Barbara 
Krambule admitted that she was artificially inseminated 
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at the University of Utah on June 23, 1991, the date of Mathew's 
conception. (R at 247). Barbara admitted she was inseminated 
with a sperm donor other than Rick Krambule as Rick was sterile. 
(Barbara Krambule's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated October 31, 1997, R at 247). Barbara 
acknowledged testimony from third parties proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt Rick was not the biological father of Mathew. 
(1/21/98 Tr. at 2,3). 
b) Barbara Krambule's Contractual Claim for Support 
of Mathew is Barred by Principles of Res Judicata 
Barbara Krambule is now precluded from asserting contractual 
rights under the artificial insemination agreement as the same is 
barred by principles of res judicata. Res judicata has two 
branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Masters v. 
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah App. 1989). At issue in this 
case is the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. Claim 
preclusion prevents relitigation of claims that have been fully 
litigated between the same parties, and also precludes claims 
which could have and should have been litigated in the prior 
action, but were not raised. See 777 P.2d at 503. 
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in 
which that cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit 
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satisfy three requirements. First, both cases must involve the 
same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged 
to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be 
one that could have and should have been raised in the first 
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 
(Utah 1988) . 
In this case, Barbara and Rick Krambule are obviously the 
same parties in both suits, the contractual claim for the support 
of Mathew could have and should have been raised in the first 
suit, and the first suit resulted in a final judgment and decree 
of divorce on the merits. 
Barbara Krambule could have and should have presented her 
contractual claim for support pursuant to the artificial 
insemination contract in the first suit as she had full and 
complete knowledge of all facts supporting the claim for support 
at that time. Barbara knew the following facts at the time of the 
first lawsuit: 
1. Barbara and Rick Krambule entered into a contract 
entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy 
through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm" on July 18, 19 90. 
(Findings of Fact No. 5 of Findings of Fact on Motion for Summary 
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Judgment). 
2. Barbara and Rick Krambule separated on May 3, 1991 
when Rick moved out of the parties' home. (Barbara Krambule's 
Deposition pg.ll). Barbara did not advise Rick she was continuing 
with artificial insemination procedures after they separated. 
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition pg. 18-19). 
3. Barbara Krambule conceived Mathew on June 23, 1991 
by means of artificial insemination at the University of Utah. 
(Barbara Krambule's Deposition, pg. 17-18). Barbara knew she had 
conceived Mathew in July, 1991. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition pg. 
18) . 
4. Rick Krambule filed for divorce in August, 1991. 
(Complaint). 
5. Barbara filed an Answer and Counterclaim for 
divorce on September 3, 1991 but did not allege she was pregnant 
nor did she ever amend her pleadings to so allege. (Answer and 
Counterclaim). 
6. Barbara's attorney wrote a letter dated December 3, 
1991 that Barbara debated at great lengths whether she should 
pursue the support of the child she was expecting and had decided 
to pursue it. The letter explains she is between four (4) and six 
(6) months pregnant and had conceived by means of artificial 
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insemination. (Barbara Krambule's Deposition Exhibit 2). 
7. Mathew Krambule was born during the course of the 
marriage, date of birth March 24, 1992 and was conceived by 
artificial insemination. (Finding of Fact No. 2, Findings of Fact 
to Modified Decree of Divorce). 
8. The parties' Decree of Divorce was signed and 
entered by the Court on the 3rd day of April, 1992, after Mathew's 
birth. (Finding No. 2, Findings of Fact to Modified Decree of 
Divorce). 
9. Barbara's attorney signed the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce approved as to form. 
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce). 
10. The trial court found Barbara's decision to make 
no claim for Mathew was carefully considered and during the period 
she had assistance of counsel. (Finding 9e., Findings of Fact to 
Modified Decree of Divorce). 
11. Barbara testified she changed her position in 
regard to making Mathew an issue at the time of the divorce as she 
just wanted to sign the divorce papers. (4/30/98 at 96-97). 
12. Barbara thought the best thing for all of us for 
now is just to get divorced. (4/30/98 Tr. at 97). 
13. In the divorce, Barbara received from Rick for her 
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failure to assert a claim for support for Mathew alimony of 
$274.00 per month and all reasonable expenses for books and 
tuition for four (4) years to attend Weber State University; and 
Rick proceeded to live his life without consideration as to any 
financial obligations for Mathew. (Finding #10, Findings of Fact 
to Modified Decree of Divorce). 
Barbara filed a Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce in 
July, 1996 seeking support for Mathew approximately four (4) years 
and three (3) months after the Decree of Divorce was entered. 
Sound policy, principles of judicial economy, fairness to the 
parties, and finality to legal controversies mandate that Barbara 
Krambule's claim be barred by principles of res judicata. 
Barbara knowingly agreed to a Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
which did not provide for support of Mathew. Barbara does not 
claim she filed a motion for relief from the judgment or to set 
aside the Decree of Divorce under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, alleging mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or execusable 
neglect, fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct. Nor did 
she file an independent action for fraud after the decree was 
entered. Her actions speak of one who at the time of the divorce 
intentionally did not assert any contractual rights under the 
artificial insemination contract. Her testimony makes it clear 
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she intentionally did not seek support for Mathew in the initial 
lawsuit. 
Barbara owed Rick a duty of good faith and fair dealing under 
the artificial insemination contract and should have advised him 
of her continued participation with artificial insemination 
procedures. Barbara knew she had not advised Rick of her decision 
to continue with artificial insemination after they separated and 
that Rick was unaware of what she was doing. Rick had not 
knowingly and voluntarily participated in the artificial 
insemination procedures after the parties separated on May 3, 
1991. (See paragraph 2 and 8 of the Artificial Insemination 
Agreement). 
To consent to the artificial insemination procedure at the 
University of Utah, Rick and Barbara entered into an agreement, 
which provided in part: 
2. We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy 
and request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in 
an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with semen obtained 
from an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s). 
8. We acknowledge that our participation in the 
artificial insemination procedure(s) is voluntary. 
Barbara owed Rick a duty of good faith and fair dealing and 
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should have advised Rick of her continued participation with 
artificial insemination procedures. Rick's participation must be 
voluntary and knowing and he must have an ongoing desire to 
achieve pregnancy as evidenced by his continued participation in 
the artificial insemination procedure(s). Barbara, breached her 
duty of good faith and fair dealing to Rick in the artificial 
insemination contract and having intentionally failed to assert 
her contractual rights under the agreement at the time of the 
divorce is now barred by the principles of res judicata. 
II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERR 
IN HOLDING THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
The Court of Appeals concluded there was no indication of 
any circumstances occurring after entry of the Decree of Divorce 
supporting a determination there had been a material substantial 
change of circumstances. Barbara's claim for child support for 
Mathew based on the insemination agreement could have and should 
have been asserted in the original divorce action and is therefore 
now barred under the principles of res judicata. Consequently, 
the Court of Appeals had no option but to conclude that the trial 
court erred in determining there was a substantial change of 
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circumstances and thus in modifying the Divorce Decree to impose a 
child support obligation with respect to Mathew. 
a) No Substantial Chancre of Circumstances Occurred after the 
Decree. Barbara must show that the alleged "substantial change in 
circumstances has occurred since the entry of the Decree". See 
Bavles vs. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1999) . 
In this case, the parties' Decree of Divorce was signed and 
entered by the Court on the 3rd day of April, 1992 (Decree of 
Divorce). Before the Decree of Divorce was entered, the parties 
entered into a contract entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to 
Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm 
on July 18, 1990. Barbara conceived Mathew on or about June 23, 
1991 by means of artificial insemination. Barbara Krambule knew 
she had conceived Mathew in July, 1991. Rick Krambule filed for 
divorce in August, 1991. Barbara through her attorney 
filed an Answer and Counterclaim for divorce but did not raise the 
issue of Mathew in her Counterclaim. Barbara's attorney wrote a 
letter dated December 3, 1991 acknowledging Barbara was expecting 
Mathew and had decided to pursue support of the child. Barbara 
and her attorney signed a Stipulation which provided for alimony, 
payment of her college tuition and books, and child support for 
Stephanie Krambule but did not provide for support of Mathew. 
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Mathew was born on March 24, 1992 before the divorce became final. 
The parties' Decree of Divorce was signed and entered on the 3rd 
day of April, 1992. Barbara's attorney signed the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce approved as to 
form. In short, Barbara had full knowledge of all facts to 
support her claim under the artificial insemination agreement to 
allege Rick was responsible to support Mathew. 
b) The Trial Court made no Findings to Support its 
Determination of Substantial Change of Circumstances since the 
Decree. The trial court in Conclusions of Law No. 1 determined 
there had been a substantial change of circumstance since the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce (Conclusions of Law to Modified 
Decree of Divorce). However, the Court made no Findings of Fact 
to support or explain its reasoning for determining there had been 
a substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the 
decree. Failure of the trial court to make findings on all 
material issues is a reversible error unless the facts and records 
are clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment. See Butler Crockett vs. 
Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995). The Findings 
of Fact must show the Court's Judgment or Decree follows logically 
from and is supported by the evidence. The findings should be 
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sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached. See 909 P.2d at 231. 
The Court of Appeals held there was no indication of any 
circumstances occurring after entry of the Decree to support a 
determination there had been a material substantial change of 
circumstance. To the contrary, all facts were known to Barbara at 
the time of the Decree of Divorce to allege a contractual claim 
for support of Mathew under the artificial insemination contract. 
If Barbara intended to make support of Mathew an issue under the 
artificial insemination contract, she should have and could have 
made a claim at the time of the first lawsuit; i.e., divorce 
decree. 
Barbara misperceives the ruling of the Court of Appeals and 
argues that court misapplied the standard of review in this case. 
The trial court made a conclusion of law "there has been a 
substantial change of circumstance since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce" (Conclusions of Law #1 to Modified Decree of Divorce). 
However, the trial court made no factual findings underlying or 
substantiating that conclusion. The Court of Appeals ruled 
Barbara's claim for child support for Mathew based upon the 
artificial insemination agreement could have and should have been 
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asserted in the original divorce action and is therefore now 
barred under the principles of res judicata. There is no 
indication of any circumstances occurring after entry of the 
decree supporting a determination that there had been a 
substantial change of circumstances. Consequently, the trial 
court erred in determining there was a substantial change in 
circumstances and imposing a child support obligation on Rick with 
respect to Mathew. 
Ill 
ARGUMENTS THAT PUBLIC POLICY FOR 
THE SUPPORT OF A CHILD PRECLUDES 
BARBARA KRAMBULE FROM DEFEATING 
THE CHILD'S RIGHT OF SUPPORT I S 
NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THIS CASE 
I t i s a rgued by B a r b a r a Krambule t h a t s t r o n g p u b l i c p o l i c y 
e x p r e s s i o n s of c o n c e r n f o r t h e s u p p o r t of a c h i l d h a s l o n g been a 
p a r t of Utah law; i . e . , t h a t c h i l d s u p p o r t i s t h e r i g h t of t h e 
c h i l d . However, t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n be tween s u p p o r t of a c h i l d 
by an acknowledged f a t h e r and d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a t e r n i t y p u r s u a n t 
t o an a r t i f i c i a l i n s e m i n a t i o n c o n t r a c t . 
B a r b a r a Krambule c i t e s G u l l e y v s . G u l l e y , 570 P .2d 127 (Utah 
- 1 2 -
1977) for holding every parent has the inalienable duty to support 
their children and cannot rid themselves of it. However, Gulley 
is not on point in this case because the issue is whether Rick 
Krambule is a parent of Mathew. The trial court determined that 
Rick Krambule is not the biological father of Mathew. Barbara 
Krambule could have and should have litigated the issue of 
support under the artificial insemination contract at the time of 
the divorce but chose instead to receive alimony and a college 
education. 
Barbara Krambule also cites the case of Department of Human 
Services vs. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997); Huck vs. Huck, 
734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986) and Baaas vs. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 
(Utah 1974) in support of her position. These cases were not 
concerned with determination of parentage but instead with issues 
of reimbursement of child support from an acknowledged father. 
Rick Krambule has not acknowledged he is the father of Mathew and 
adamantly refutes that contention. The cases cited by Barbara 
only have application once paternity has been legally established. 
See Irizarry, 945 P.2d at 680. Until paternity is established 
there is no duty of support. 
Inasmuch as Rick Krambule is not the biological father of 
Mathew, Barbara had an obligation to go forward at the time of the 
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initial lawsuit to pursue support under the artificial insemina-
tion contract as she was aware of all the facts to support her 
claim and Mathew was born prior to the parties' divorce becoming 
final. 
CONCLUSION 
Barbara Krambule's claim for child support for Mathew based 
on the artificial insemination agreement could have and should 
have been litigated in the original divorce case and is therefore 
barred under the principles of res judicata. There is no 
indication of any changed circumstances after entry of the Decree 
of Divorce supporting a determination there has been a material 
substantial change of circumstances. All of the elements of the 
claim preclusion branch of res judicata have been met barring 
Barbara's second lawsuit. Barbara Krambule's claim against Rick 
Krambule is a contractual claim and arguments that public policy 
for the support of children preclude any act of Barbara Krambule 
to defeat the child's right of support is not applicable in the 
context of this case. The decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in this case is consistent with Utah state law as previously ruled 
upon and presents no important or unusual questions of law which 
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should be decided by the Utah Supreme Court. 
DATED this / day of March, 2000. 
ROBERT L. NEELEY / 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Ricky D. Krambule 
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also to Paige Williamson, Attorney for Barbara Krambule, 10 
Exchange Place, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this _5 
day of March, 2000, postage prepaid. 
/i 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Ricky D. Krambule 
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